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IN SEARCH OF SKIDMORE 
Peter L. Strauss* 
 
―How terribly strange to be seventy‖1 
 
Ever since 1827, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that 
when a court is interpreting a statute that falls within the authority of an 
administrative agency, the court in reaching its own judgment about the 
statute‘s meaning should give substantial weight to the agency‘s view.2  
Repeated again and again over the years in varying formulations, this 
proposition found its apotheosis in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,3 a unanimous 
opinion authored by Justice Jackson in 1944.  His opinion took the 
proposition to be so obvious that no citation was required.  Justice 
Jackson‘s typically incisive and memorable formulation stuck.  It found its 
way into administrative law casebooks—also without reference to its many 
predecessors.  It has since been universally known as Skidmore deference, 
treated as if it were simply his remarkable invention. 
Four years earlier, the proposition had found expression in United States 
v. American Trucking Ass’ns,4 a case often considered the dawn of post-
New Deal reliance on legislative history.  The Court made clear that the 
question before it was one for it to decide, reiterating the oft-cited 
proposition of Marbury v. Madison:  ―The interpretation of the meaning of 
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial 
function.‖5  But how was it to perform this ―exclusively judicial function‖?  
 
*  Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. My profound thanks go to Peter Shane and 
Christopher Walker, who have capped their efforts in organizing this symposium with a 
remarkable initial essay providing its readers with an overview of the whole.  See Peter M. 
Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking 
Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (2014).  I hope I may be forgiven, as one of the elders at 
the symposium, for having so concentrated on two cases from 1944 whose relationship 
seems to me to capture exactly the considerations of judicial role underlying Chevron, the 
1984 opinion whose notoriety and thirtieth birthday provided the occasion for this 
intellectual feast.  That my views on Chevron may differ from some of those who joined me 
at table should surprise no one who has followed the torrent of opinions and scholarship that 
have sprung from that decision. 
 
 1. SIMON & GARFUNKEL, Old Friends, on BOOKENDS (Columbia Records 1968). 
 2. Edwards‘ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 206, 210 (1827).  For this history, see generally 
Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and 
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012). 
 3. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 4. 310 U.S. 534 (1940). 
 5. Id. at 544. 
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Five pages further on in its opinion, explaining the weight it was giving to 
agency views in doing so, the Court remarked: 
The [two responsible agencies] . . . as we have said, have both interpreted 
Section 204(a) as relating solely to safety of operation.  In any case such 
interpretations are entitled to great weight.  This is peculiarly true here 
where the interpretations involve ―contemporaneous construction of a 
statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery 
in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they 
are yet untried and new.‖  Furthermore, the Commission‘s interpretation 
gains much persuasiveness from the fact that it was the Commission 
which suggested the provisions‘ enactment to Congress.6 
This passage states three reasons for this recognition of the weight a 
court should give an agency view:  the agency‘s arguably better view as 
sometime drafter; its obligations as the body responsible for putting the 
scheme in motion; and, implicit ―in any case,‖ the fact of its continuous and 
comprehensive view of (and responsibilities for) a statutory scheme that 
would reach the courts only occasionally and in what would likely be quite 
unrepresentative contexts. 
In the same year as Skidmore, 1944, the Court took the further step of 
placing a question that one might readily characterize as an issue of 
statutory interpretation outside the ―exclusively judicial function.‖  In 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,7 it found, additionally, that the statute it 
was interpreting had conferred on an administrative agency the primary 
responsibility for determining, from a policy perspective, the meaning of a 
statutory term that lacked fixed content.8  The National Labor Relations 
Act9 applied to ―employees.‖10  While surely there were individuals who 
must be regarded as employees (paid hourly wages, lacking managerial 
responsibilities) and others who could not be so regarded (corporate 
executives, occasional individual contractors), there was a middle ground 
open to argument.  The Court found, first, that Congress could not have 
intended ―employee‖ to be governed in the administration of a national 
statute by the use of varying state law.11  It found, second, that ―employee‖ 
had no uniform meaning in federal statutes.  What remained, the Court 
concluded, was that giving precise meaning to ―employee‖ under this 
statute, within the middle ground whose existence it had determined, must 
be a function of national labor policy.12  But Congress had made the 
formulation of national labor policy the responsibility of the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB).  While courts remained responsible to oversee the 
legality and reasonableness of the Board‘s judgments, this valid delegation 
of authority to the Board carried with it the corollary that courts could not 
 
 6. Id. at 549 (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 
(1933)). 
 7. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 8. Id. at 124–25. 
 9. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 10. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124–25. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
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properly substitute their own judgment about the precise application of the 
statutory term to particular circumstances for that of the Board.  Within the 
middle ground, assigning meaning to ―employee‖ was thus a responsibility 
of the Board, not the courts. 
Hearst, too, joined the administrative law pantheon, although law school 
teaching materials long questioned whether it could be reconciled with 
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,13 a decision that seemed oblivious to the 
NLRB‘s judgment about meaning.  In Packard, the statute defined an 
―employer‖ as ―any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or 
indirectly.‖14  The question for the Court was whether any employee who in 
some respects served as a foreman could ever be considered a statutory 
―employee‖ under the labor laws, or rather must always be considered an 
―employer.‖15  The NLRB‘s judgment had wavered over time—coming 
down on the side of ―employee‖ status for the 1100 foremen involved in 
Packard, but seemingly adopting another view in other cases.  Whether the 
NLRB had reached an impermissible interpretation of the Labor Act was, 
the Court declared, a ―naked question of law,‖ on which the agency‘s view 
counted for naught.16 
Reconciliation is possible if one understands the question as one of 
boundary definition—could workers who were ―foremen‖ ever be statutory 
employees?  Put this way, it is a question to which Skidmore might have 
been relevant, but not Hearst.  While the Justices agreed with the Board that 
Packard‘s foremen might possibly be characterized as ―employees,‖17 they 
were deciding not who was an employee, but where the boundary for the 
Board‘s permissible determination of that question lay.  The extent of the 
Board‘s authority presented an irreducibly judicial question, in American 
Trucking‘s terms was ―exclusively a judicial function.‖  The thing to note is 
that the Board‘s vacillation on the issue provided a standard reason, under 
the cases captured in Skidmore, for the Court to disregard its views. 
Seventy years ago, then, Skidmore and Hearst combined to frame two 
propositions:  first, that when courts are interpreting statutes, they may 
sometimes have reason to give weight to agency views; and second, that to 
the extent Congress empowers an agency to act using language of uncertain 
meaning, it may also empower the agency reasonably to determine that 
meaning within the resulting ambit of uncertainty, subject not to judicial 
redetermination but to judicial oversight of its judgment for reasonableness. 
Four decades later, Justice Stevens authored Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,18 the opinion whose thirtieth 
birthday is the occasion for this symposium.  Written for a unanimous 
(although short-handed) Court whose Justices seemed to have had no 
 
 13. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). 
 14. Id. at 488 (citing National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152). 
 15. See id. at 486. 
 16. Id. at 493. 
 17. Id. at 497–98. 
 18. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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thought that they were doing anything momentous,19 it can be understood to 
have universalized Hearst.  Chevron, that is, created a presumption that to 
the extent any statute conferring authority for its administration on a 
particular agency lacked a fixed meaning, the room its terms left open had 
the effect that the Hearst Court had found to be explicit in the NLRA‘s use 
of the term ―employee.‖  The uncertainties were to be regarded as 
delegations to those agencies of a responsibility reasonably to choose 
among the possibilities the statutory language offered.  If the Justices found 
nothing momentous or controversial in this, of course they were wrong.  
Chevron has become the most cited of all opinions in the administrative law 
canon, and it seems as well to have generated the largest body of scholarly 
literature. 
One quails at the thought of adding further to so many views of the 
elephant, but a surprise in the decision last Term in City of Arlington v. 
FCC20 incites it.  The surprise?  In Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion and 
Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent for himself and Justices Kennedy and Alito, 
184 years of what we have recently been calling Skidmore deference simply 
disappeared.  Save once in Justice Breyer‘s lonely concurrence in the 
result,21 there is not a mention of the concept—indeed, its relevance is 
effectively denied—in opinions signed by eight of the Justices. 
SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND TO THE DISCUSSION OF CITY OF ARLINGTON 
An intermediate development that underscores the surprise should be 
mentioned.  Hearst (that is to say, Chevron‘s direct ancestor) and Skidmore 
appear side by side in United States v. Mead Corp.,22 a case in which an 
agency (the Customs Bureau) had given uncertain statutory language a 
particular meaning, but without acting in the manner in which Congress had 
intended for its acts to be juris-generative—that is, authoritative for any 
case but the one before it.  Justice Souter, writing for eight, thus treated the 
interpretive task as wholly the courts‘—Chevron did not apply.23  
Nonetheless, in reaching its own judgment, in its own interpretation, he 
wrote, citing Skidmore, a court should observe the practice of centuries and 
accord appropriate weight to agency views.24  Justice Scalia wrote a lonely 
and furious dissent—Chevron, he argued, had consigned Skidmore to the 
waste-bin of history.25  There was no room for a second proposition about 
deference; it had to be all (that is, Chevron, which he would have applied) 
or nothing.  The Skidmore formulation, he argued, was just too weak, an 
invitation to judicial manipulation.26  Justice Souter‘s response to his 
fulminations is, for me, a classic: 
 
 19. Thomas Merrill, The Story of Chevron:  The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2005). 
 20. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 21. See id. at 1876 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 22. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 23. Id. at 221. 
 24. See id. at 227–30. 
 25. See id. at 239–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 26. See id. at 241. 
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Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at 
least some of this multifarious administrative action, we have to decide 
how to take account of the great range of its variety.  If the primary 
objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or withholding 
deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discretionary 
administrative action must be declared irrelevant or minimized.  If, on the 
other hand, it is simply implausible that Congress intended such a broad 
range of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of 
administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all, 
then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action must be taken 
into account. Justice Scalia‘s first priority over the years has been to limit 
and simplify.  The Court‘s choice has been to tailor deference to variety.  
This acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to 
recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just as the Court 
has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect 
Chevron deference.27 
―Deference‖ is only one proposition concerning judicial review where 
one might observe a contrast between simplifications to a single standard, 
and tailoring to variety. This was hardly the first occasion on which Justice 
Scalia‘s preferences for categorical simplicity led him into what for many 
scholars of administrative law—as he once had been—were remarkable 
surprises. 
As a court of appeals judge, Judge Scalia had similarly attempted to 
reduce to singular terms standards of review that were binary by statute, and 
even more complex in practice.  Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System28 
required review both of an on-the-record adjudication, under the 
Administrative Procedure Act‘s (APA) ―substantial evidence‖ test,29 and of 
a rulemaking, subject to arbitrary and capriciousness review.30  Ignoring 
both the standard textualist trope that different verbal formulations in a 
statute require different attributions of meaning, and the commonplace 
difference between appellate review of a district court judge‘s findings of 
fact (―clearly erroneous‖?) and a jury‘s (―no reasonable juror could find‖?), 
Judge Scalia asserted that it would be impossible to imagine or administer 
more than one standard of review of administrative findings of fact.31  In its 
practical administration, even arbitrary and capriciousness review itself is 
highly variable.32  Just as we treat ―preponderance,‖ ―clear and 
 
 27. Id. at 236–37 (majority opinion).  Justice Souter adds:   
It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hard-
edged rule.  But Chevron itself is a good example showing when Chevron 
deference is warranted, while this is a good case showing when it is not.  Judges in 
other, perhaps harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two 
examples, the way courts have always done. 
Id. at 237 & n.18. 
 28. 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 31. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., 745 F.2d at 680–86. 
 32. Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983) (hard-look review of important rules), with Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (soft-
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convincing,‖ and ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ as identifying different, if 
not logarithmically reducible zones of confidence in affirmative fact-
finding, ―no reasonable juror could find,‖ ―arbitrary and capricious,‖ 
―unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,‖ and 
―clearly erroneous‖ can readily fit different places in the other half of the 
judicial scale of confidence in (another‘s) fact-finding, between zero and ―I 
find, de novo.‖  Justice Scalia‘s contrary view—that the two administrative 
review standards are each identical to the jury review standard—ultimately 
is grounded in a 1939 opinion of the Supreme Court33 enunciating the 
review standard that the Court later found the APA to have rejected, in what 
had been its most cited administrative law opinion before Chevron, 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.34 
In Universal Camera, the Court had found in the APA‘s adoption of the 
―substantial evidence‖ test the expression of a congressional ―mood‖ 
requiring closer review of agency fact-finding in cases to which the test 
applied.35  Judge Scalia‘s court, as others, had found that same ―mood‖ in 
congressional statutes that required ―substantial evidence‖ review of a 
particular agency‘s rulemaking, albeit those rules were adopted under 
procedures that normally would invoke ―arbitrary or capricious‖ review.36  
In 1999, the ―substantial evidence‖ test would be associated with the more 
demanding ―clearly erroneous‖ standard reviewing bench trial findings of 
fact in Dickinson v. Zurko.37 
Universal Camera again received the back of Justice Scalia‘s hand in 
1998, when he authored the Court‘s surprising38 opinion—again involving 
factual review—in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB.39 
 
touch review of informal adjudication), with Am. Horse Protection Ass‘n, Inc. v. Lyng, 812 
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ordinarily highly permissive review of refusal to accept rulemaking 
petition). 
 33. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939). 
 34. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 35. Id. at 487. 
 36. See generally Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 
1974); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); AFL v. OSHA, 965 
F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 37. 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (―The court/agency standard . . . is somewhat less strict 
than the court/court standard.  But the difference is . . . so fine that . . . we have failed to 
uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard 
rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.‖). 
 38. See, e.g., 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 775 
(4th ed. 2002) (―The majority opinion is extraordinary in terms of its degree of departure 
from the Court‘s traditional approach to the substantial evidence test.‖); M. Elizabeth Magill, 
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1429 n.152 (2004) (―Some 
scholars point to the recent case of [Allentown Mack] as illustrative of a new era of intense 
examination of agency factfinding.‖ (citation omitted)); Note, Judicial Review Gone Awry:  
The Supreme Court Rewrites the NLRB’s Unitary Standard in Allentown Mack Sales & 
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1925 (1999). 
 39. 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
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CITY OF ARLINGTON 
In City of Arlington v. FCC the underlying question was whether the 
FCC had the authority under its statute to define what would presumptively 
be ―a reasonable period of time‖ for state or local governments to act on 
applications for the siting of wireless facilities.40  The Court framed the 
issue for its decision as being whether the Chevron framework applied to its 
review of this question.41  With Chief Justice Roberts in dissent, assignment 
of the majority opinion fell to the senior sitting Justice—Justice Scalia—
and, given this opportunity, he assigned the opinion to himself.  By sleight 
of hand, perhaps, he appears to have accomplished in City of Arlington the 
proposition for which he alone argued in Mead.  In majority and dissent, for 
eight, deference means only one thing, Chevron.  Skidmore and its many 
predecessors have disappeared. 
That the Chevron framework would apply was to some extent a forgone 
conclusion—the FCC was acting formally, with evident juris-generative 
intent.  The real question would be how the decision framing the FCC‘s 
authority was allocated between agency and court—to what extent the 
Court would decide issues for itself (as in Hearst it had concluded that 
neither state law not a general federal meaning of ―employee‖ controlled, 
but rather a definition responsive to national labor policy, the assigned 
bailiwick of the NLRB), and to what extent it would simply review for 
―reasonableness‖ the exercise of an authority it had found to be assigned to 
another.  Justice Scalia, for five, treated the first of these questions (what 
were the outer limits of agency authority) as if it were simply a matter of 
textual analysis:  ―Statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds 
of reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering 
agency.‖42  Implicit here is that ―the bounds of reasonable interpretation‖ 
are for judicial and not agency determination.  And later, to the same effect:  
―The question in every case is, simply, whether the statutory text forecloses 
the agency‘s assertion of authority.‖43  And, finally:  ―Where Congress has 
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the 
ambiguity will fairly allow,‖ a matter to be determined ―rigorously.‖44 
These are the questions of Chevron‘s first step, and thus these questions 
are for the court, not the agency.  They are, moreover, questions for a court 
applying ―traditional tools of statutory interpretation‖—tools which, until 
this day, would have included appropriate (that is to say, Skidmore) 
deference to agency views.  Wholly missing from Justice Scalia‘s opinion, 
however, was any suggestion that agency views would influence the 
decision how far ambiguity would fairly allow, what the statutory text 
forecloses, or what are the bounds of reasonable interpretation.  Instead he 
takes the question to be whether agency views respecting its ―jurisdiction‖ 
under an ambiguous statute are in any respect different from its other 
 
 40. See 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866–68 (2013). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 1868. 
 43. Id. at 1871. 
 44. Id. at 1874. 
796 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
conclusions how to act within the space its statute affords it, and concludes 
at length that they are not.  Any views within ―the bounds of reasonable 
interpretation‖ are voiced at Chevron‘s second step and so are entitled to 
Chevron deference.  How those bounds are to be set—in effect, how the 
questions of ―authority‖ that remain for judicial determination differ from 
the questions of ―jurisdiction‖ on which agency views are entitled to 
Chevron deference—is simply not addressed.  The 184 years of precedent 
captured in Skidmore have disappeared. 
The Chief Justice‘s dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, 
underscores Justice Scalia‘s coup in removing Skidmore and its many 
predecessors from view.  He expresses concern that the majority, by 
extending the Chevron framework to issues of ―jurisdiction,‖ has 
compromised the constitutionally necessary authority of the courts to have 
the final, independent say what the law is.  ―An agency cannot exercise 
interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys 
that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the 
agency. . . .  [A] court should not defer to an agency on whether Congress 
has granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory ambiguity at 
issue.‖45  But in American Trucking, as we have seen, the Court had readily 
reconciled what we have until now known as Skidmore deference with the 
necessary authority of courts finally to say what the law is.46  Its reasoning 
soon became Skidmore, not Chevron.  One can readily agree with the 
dissent‘s proposition that ―[w]hether Congress has conferred such power is 
the ‗relevant question[] of law‘ that must be answered before affording 
Chevron deference,‖47 without at all having to agree that ―the question 
whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without 
deference to the agency.‖48  Without Chevron deference, yes; without 
Skidmore deference, no. 
If one puts aside the verbal tussling over ―jurisdiction,‖ much if not all of 
the disagreement disappears.  What are the boundaries of the agency‘s 
authority, conferred by Congress, remains a judicial question, as it must be.  
Could recognizing the bearing of agency views at the initial stage of the 
Chevron inquiry ever make a difference?  Justice Scalia calls up FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.49 and MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.50 (among many other cases) as 
two cases in which Chevron had been applied (as indeed it was) ―to 
agencies‘ construction of the scope of their own jurisdiction,‖ and in each 
of these cases to an ―expansive construction of the extent of its own power 
[that] would have wrought a fundamental change in the regulatory 
scheme.‖51  But these were also cases in which the agency interpretations 
 
 45. Id. at 1877, 1879–80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 46. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 47. Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1880 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 49. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 50. 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 51. Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1872 (majority opinion). 
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were ―permissible‖ as a textual matter, as heated dissents amply 
demonstrated.52  Why did that not suffice?  Agencies operating within their 
judicially determined Chevron space may change their views from time to 
time; their decisions do not fix statutory meaning in the ways that court 
decisions do, and they are expected to vary in their views as changing 
circumstances warrant.  And the agencies involved in these cases had ample 
reason to change their view of their governing texts.  In the one case, 
evidence had emerged of cigarette companies covertly manipulating the 
nicotine content of their products to induce addiction; in the other case, the 
supplanting of land lines by microwave transmission had undercut the 
natural monopolies telephone companies had to that point enjoyed, and thus 
undercut as well the need for rate regulation. 
The centuries-old judicial tradition of giving weight to agency views was 
premised on stability, participation in the legislative process, and superior 
knowledge of congressional purpose; changing views of statutory meaning 
would undercut it.  If ordinarily agency views respecting their authority 
would be entitled to weight, in each of these cases the agency‘s departure 
from its own long-established understandings of its powers signaled danger, 
not simply an expectable revision of policy to keep pace with changing 
times and social circumstances.  While not mentioning Skidmore by name, 
the majority in these cases was able to stop its inquiry at the first step, on 
finding an impermissible meaning given earlier, stable agency views that 
commanded respect. 
Justice Scalia was the author of MCI and joined Brown & Williamson.  
So he agrees that the boundaries of agency authority are not movable over 
time, that the space, the authority, an agency has, remains a matter for 
judicial determination and for determination not simply as a matter of 
―permissible‖ textual meaning.  That determination, as Justice Stevens 
wrote in Chevron, is to be made employing the ―traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation.‖53  And few of those tools are more traditional than 
the one that was first voiced by the Court in 1827, repeatedly invoked over 
the ensuing years, and captured by Justice Jackson‘s formulation in 
Skidmore. 
 
 52. At issue in MCI was the FCC‘s statutory authority to ―modify‖ its rate regulation. 
512 U.S. at 220.  As a dissent made clear, ―modify‖ would bear the FCC‘s meaning. Id. at 
239–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For the majority, however, considering the state of 
telecommunications technology in the 1930s, when the statute was enacted, the meaning the 
FCC now wished to give it was unsustainable—it was for Congress, not the Commission, to 
effect such a change in FCC rate regulation, however understandable the change might be in 
light of technological changes and the current fashionability of deregulation. See id. at 231 
(majority opinion).  In FDA v. Brown & Willamson, the FDA had adopted new regulatory 
measures in relation to tobacco products, relying on both increased evidence of the risks to 
human health created by their use and commercial behavior by manufacturers manipulating 
and concealing the addictive qualities of nicotine, whose pleasurable effects give humans the 
reason to use it. See generally 529 U.S. 120 (2000).  Statutory definitions of ―drug‖ readily 
reached nicotine and of ―device,‖ cigarettes.  But the agency‘s long-held view that it had no 
regulatory authority over tobacco products unless benefits to health were claimed, repeatedly 
expressed to Congress, were an essential element of the Court‘s conclusion that the FDA had 
acted outside its statutory authority. See id. at 161. 
 53. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
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The ostensible renunciation of long-established precedent is not the only 
mischief to be found in Justice Scalia‘s opinion.  In emphasizing that the 
Chevron Step Two question is whether an agency interpretation is 
―permissible‖—that is, it would seem, simply within the textual bounds of 
the authority the Court finds Congress to have given it—his opinion diverts 
attention from, if it does not entirely repudiate, the judiciary‘s statutory 
responsibilities under the APA.  Just as choosing to emphasize Chevron‘s 
somewhat misleading diction about ―precise meaning‖ has concealed from 
some judges using it the judiciary‘s responsibility to establish the 
boundaries of the ambiguity within which agencies may act, quoting 
Chevron‘s use of ―permissible‖ without considering the opinion‘s 
considerable attention to the reasonableness of the Environmental 
Protection Agency‘s choice at issue in that case obscures the APA‘s 
command to judicial oversight of agency action.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
requires courts in every review of agency action controlled by the APA to 
determine whether it is ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law‖—that is to say, reasonable. 
Cherry-picking language from earlier opinions without attention to the 
context in which it was used is a familiar enough judicial failing.54  
Language in Justice Steven‘s opinion in Chevron does tend to elide the 
possible difference between those interpretations that are merely 
―permissible‖ and those that are also ―reasonable‖—not just possible, but 
also well explained, well related to the materials known to the agency, 
based on appropriate factors and not based upon inappropriate ones.  Yet 
the detail and care of the Chevron opinion makes clear that this prescription 
had been followed, notwithstanding the opinion‘s occasional misleading 
diction.  Justice Souter‘s opinion in Mead, describing Chevron, twice 
equates its second step with Section 706(2)(A) review—as indeed one 
would think it must.  A court could hardly ignore that statutory command 
and conclude that mere permissibility, without regard to reasonableness, 
suffices.  But ―permissible‖ appears again and again in Justice Scalia‘s 
discussions of Chevron, and ―reasonable‖ does not.  Quoting only that 
diction, his opinion concludes:  ―If . . . the agency‘s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute,‖ that is the end of the matter.55  For 
all that appears, and despite Section 706(2)(A), the reasonableness of its 
judgment is of no concern. 
 
 54. Cf. Adam Liptak, Steady Move to the Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2013, at A1 
(―Chief Justice Roberts has proved adept at persuading the court‘s more liberal justices to 
join compromise opinions, allowing him to cite their concessions years later as the basis for 
closely divided and deeply polarizing conservative victories.‖). 
 55. Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868. 
